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Ostrołęka - 14th of February 1807 by Witold Kubeł, photos by Stefan Swietliczko |
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Preparings to the battle
After the battle at Iława Benningsen decided to concentrate his forces against the expected next fight with army of Napoleon. He ordered Essen to attack Savary and move towards Pruss. At the same time he called 6th Division of Siedmioradski from Goniądz. Essen prepared plan of the attack on the French on the both sides of Narew river. From Goniądz 6th Division was to set out accompanied by the troop of Wołkoński, that had been expected to join Siedmioradski before. On the left side of Narew river he planned the strike towards Ostrołłeka with the rest of his forces. While on 14th of February he was to set out from Goniądz, through Kolno to Ostrołęka Siedmioradski received the order of the Benningsen of the set off for the main forces. He decided to fulfill it without any delay. As the effect of that fact Wołkoński was lest alone with four regiments of his 9th Division. It was following troops: -ukrainian regiment of musqueteers under command of general Budberg, -krym regiment of musqueteers under command of Baumgarten, -10th regiment of jaggier under command of Brezgun, -cossaks regiment under command of Iłowajski, -three squadrons of dragoons from Mitawa, All these troops crossed on 14th of February Pisa river near the Dobry Las. On the second day Russians faced up with the brigade of Graindorge, that was placed by Savary in Siedliska. Because of the pressure of French Wołkonski retreated behind the Szkwa and waited up to 16th of February to continue the attack. Battle at Ostrołęka After the fight of the front guards of Graindorge with Wołkoński Savary received perhaps message of Chef of the staff of Great Army marshal Berthier, dated on 13th of February. Napoleon expressed his disappointment with the events that happened on the left wing of the Great Army. It was evoked by the events in the Myszyniec and Wielbark. He ordered to Savary to leave in Ostrołęka four battalions of infantry, regiment of chivalry and four cannons. With the rest he was to cross Narew on its right bank and join with grenadiers of Oudinot in Wielbark. It seemed that Napoleon wanted to have the observing corps closer to him so that to use it in new battle, that was expected after the occurrences of 8th February. Savary he could not perform the order. Soldiers caught russian officer, that was going with the message from Essen to Benningsen. In this information general Essen informed that he is ready to attack the forces of Savary. Russians - they did not manage to surprise the French. He knew about the serious russian forces at the Goniądz and corps of Essen on the left side of the Narew river. The only one thing he did not know was from which side the main attack might have came. Savary he tried to predict that main attack would came from the right side because of the following facts: in case of success while attacking from the north the enemy could either hare the Ostrołęka or the bridge, that cut the way on the right side of Narew. Next passage by the river might stay in the Pułtusk. There might have been also danger that till the moment Vth corps reached it Russians might have either attacked the communication lines with Warsaw or gone towards Pruss. It is difficult not to find the logic in this deduction, but on the other hand there is also different use of it because of the luck and fortune. The set off of Siedmioradski seriously weaken the strike of the Wołkoński on the right side and the main forces were concentrated on the attack at the side of Łomża. On 15th of February there stayed in Ostrołęka 2nd Division of Gazan without one Brigade of Graindorge, that patrolled the right side of Narew on area from Siedliska till Stanisławów. It had the fight in the hours of afternoon with forces of Wołkoński. Moreover in Ostrołęka there stayed the whole Division of grenadiers of Oudinot. On the 10 hour in the morning there appeared strong reconnaissance of chivalry from the avant-garde of Essen. Expecting the fight on the next day Savary sent to Suchet the message so that he came back from Myszyniec. On the other hand he knew that the return of the Division might last till the evening of 16th of February. At that time he was preparing to the main attack of enemy on the right side. It started froze day of 16th of February, Thursday. On the 4 in the morning Savary left Brigade of infantry from 2nd Division of Gazan and command laid to General Campana. This brigade was composed on four battalions. Beside that in the town there was left Brigade of grenadiers of general Ruffin with six cannons. Both generals understood each other very well and next occurrences it would confirmed. Rest of the forces set off from Ostrołęka by the road to Siedliska and Łęg. On the front of the column there walked general Gazan leading six battalions of his Division, that had been left at him. In the distance of one mile there was going general Oudinot leading six regiments of grenadiers. Fights at Stanisławów Contct with the Russians happened at 9 in the morning on the road to Nowogrod at Stanisławów. Wołkoński retreated behind the Szkwa river, pushed by the much more numerous forces and from that positions opened fire on the attacking Gazan. French found the fords in the river and started to go around the russian positions at their left. The commander of the Ukrainian Regiment of Budberg was wounded seriously at that time and chief of the 10th jaggier regiment Brezgun laid dead. "the oldest after Bezgun colonel Zwarykin, whose name had been associated with the fame of Szrywań regiment in wars of tsar abroad of Russia, took the flag with the lieutenant Romaszkow and drove the attack on bayonets. Strong defense did not stop the French, that took our wings over. Prince Wołkoński keeping the order in lines retreated on the positions in Ossowiecko, which he noticed at the sunrise. Nevertheless he had to leave one cannon, which staff was either wounded or died and horses were killed. On the new position he opened fire on the enemy with bullets and cast shots. The French started again surrounding attack and there was started heavy fight. Lieutenant of the 10th Jaggier Regiment Michajłow with volunteers fought the cannon back. Then he also conquered french caisson with munitions and horses. Ensign Nielidow and corporal Semin, who saw that shaft of the flags are shot they take it out, tied around their bodies and were continuing the fight. Shooting off they went on the new position and from that place they had to retreat because of the much more numerous forces of enemy. They directed themselves towards a wood behind their positions. Cannons situated on the border of the wood stopped the French." All this was noted by Michajłowski-Danilewski. Savary reported shortly: "At 9 o clock general Gazan met the enemy in march, who attacked him. He defeated the troops covering the road and wood with dead enemies, took three cannons and one russian flag and then continued the action with success. But suddenly there was possible to hear the cannonade and shots in Ostrołęka". Chef of the Staff of the Vth Corps general Reille expressed his willingness to going back to the town and enter on the command. While he arrived there he found the town wounded with bullets.
Battle at Ostrołęka As we have already mentioned Savary crossing the Narew on its right side left in Ostrołeka defense two brigades. First one of Campana was a part of the 2nd Division of Gazan and it was consisted by two regiments of light infantry: 21st regiment with colonel Duhamel and 28th regiment with colonel Praske. Each of it had two battalions. Four battalions of Campana were consisting total 3100 men and cooperated with the Brigade of grenadiers of the Oudinot Division. It was commanded by the general Ruffin. That brigade was composed with 1st and 2nd regiments, that meant also four battalions. Its state was 2300 people. In total there was around 5400 men not including the artillery in defense of Ostrołęka. Those troops took positions in dunes around the town. In the morning og 16th of February troops of Essen started gathering from the side of Łomża (north-east). It was 10th Division of Meller-Zakomielski and part of 9th Division of Wołkoński, that totally were consisting around 30 thousand men. Three strong columns of russian infantry stormed on the french defense and drove it back from the dunes. Russians they stormed in purpose to gain the bridge. Grenadiers of Ruffin they retreated on the streets of Ostrołęka and settled on the cemetery around the church. From that place they started the fire of cast shots. Brigade of Campana, that was staying at the opposite side of the Narew went with aid for grenadiers. During the attack general Campana was wounded with bullet in his neck and laid dead. That did not weaken the defense of the french, that was successfully supported by the artillery from the opposite side of the river. Perhaps in this early phase of the battle general Reille arrived to the Ostrołęka and took the command of the defense. Two storms of the russian infantry were retorted and the field of the battle was mostly thanks to the fire of the artillery covered with the bodies of the Russians. Reille he could not attack because of the proportion of the forces, but thanks to this facts he gained again positions outside of the town in the dunes. Nearly for two hours he endured the fire of 30 cannons of enemy. Next attack of the Russians was carried out between 2 and 3 on the clock in the afternoon. At that time Savary was ready with its troop on the opposite side of Narew to attack. After the set off of Reille from Stanisławów, observing the success of Gazan`s action and retreat of the Wołkoński he ordered to Oudinot set off from Ostrołęka with its grenadiers. On the other hand he urged Suchet to as quick as possible return with its 1st Division and the part of the dragoons. Around the 1 on the clock the troops of Suchet and Oudinot started arrival to Ostrołęka so that to stand over there infull assembly in one hour. in the front there marched 17th regiment of light infantry and artillery of a long range. Russian stood in the distance of the fire and were formed in five grand columns of infantry and around 29 squadrons of chivalry. Against them there set out the French in composed in following way: -in the right wing there stood grenadiers. In the first line there stood the Brigade of Ruffin and in the second line last six battalions. The command of the whole this wing belonged to Oudinot, -in center there was 1st Division of the Suchet, -on the left wing there was the most weak as it was composed by the brigade of Campana, that was commanded by general Reille on behalf of the dead Campana. The whole chivalry that consisted 10 squadrons were waiting in the reverse. At the protection of the strong fire of artillery the troops moved to fight. After some time the left wing of the Russians it did not endured the storm of grenadiers and the defense fell. While it became visible Savary ordered to chivalry support Oudinot. Cheval forces started attack. It was 4 on the clock in the afternoon. In the charge there was distinguished the brigade of dragoons of general Rigaud, who was wounded. Also it deserved to be distinguished the 15th Regiment of the Dragoons under command of the colonel Barthelemy. It changed the front of attack in the full gallop and attacked the chivalry of enemy. During the fights the russian general Suworow was also wounded. Oudinot claimed after some time that he could capture much more Russians in case the charge of chivalry had happened half of the hour before. When the danger on the left wing became visible Essane ad to order the retreat. Savary pressing constantly arrived to Susk, where the fighting sides were divided by the darkness of the night. The French they accommodated there on the night. At the same time the troops of Essen were continuing the retreat towards to Zambrów. In the night the froze weakened and it became thawing weather. On the 17th of February French moved towards Toszyn and Kleczków but they were finding only the escaping chivalry of the enemy, that avoided the fight. Around the noon general Oudinot decided to fulfill earlier order of the napoleon and move towards to Wielbark. The 5th Corps stayed in Susk up to the evening and then returned to Ostrołęka. For the special distinguishing deserved general Reile, that having two brigades managed to keep the bridge at Ostrołęka up to the arrival of Savary. General Ruffin gained the fame by performing under the fire of cast shots of 20 cannons the change of the aim of his fire of the short distance and then repelled the attack on bayonets of column of russian infantry, that was accessing to the town. Then Savary distinguished the brigade of dragoons of Rigaud, that was wounded during the charge at the left wing of the enemy and also the colonel Taupin, commander of 103rd Regiment of infantry, to whom Savary asked for the promotion to rank of general of brigade. Chef of the 21st Regiment of Light Infantry, colonel Duhamel was deadly wounded. Fame and military advantages of the generals Savary, Gazan and Oudinot were described ant there was no need to precise it to Napoleon. It is worth to point out the special role of the grenadiers of Oudinot. Huge lost were sustained by the French artillery. Colonel Nourit (?), who commanded it at Ostrołęka was wounded. One of the cannons, that belonged to the Gazan`s Division was pushed out in the rush of the battle on the ice of Narew, but under the load it broke the ice and sunk. Main booty of the French was 7 cannons and 3 flags. Estimation of the forces and lost of both sides in battle at Stanisławów and Ostrołęka Data of the number of armies engaged in this fights is not precisely known. Forces of Wołkoński are estimated as 5-6 thousands men. General Gazan had no less than 4-5 thousands of soldiers of his division and 3-5 thousands of grenadiers of Oudinot. We can observe that at the fights at Stanisławów the superiority was at the french side. At the Ostrołęka in the first phase of the battle superiority was at the Corps of Essen. His forces are estimated at different levels. Dumas reported 22000, Savary mentioned first 12-15.000 and then after the discussion with russian captured officers precizes it at level of 30.000 men. The 62nd Bulletin of the Grat Army reported about 25.000 men in the whole corps of Essen. From the estimation published on the 17 page it seemed that the number is 30.000 men. But we could not say if all of the troops fought in the battle. We can suspect that all of them were. The only one russian source is the work of Michaiłowski-Danilewski, but there is no datas about this. Finally it might be reasonable to suspect that russian forces were of number 36.000 and at the french side 25.400 soldiers. Two french brigades defending Ostrołęka in the first phase numbered no more than 5500 men and their behavior is worth the best appreciation. In the second phase after the arrival of Divisions of Suchet and Oudinot Savary he could face up the forces of Essen by the number of 19.000 men. Using this figures we can point out the lost of both sides. Again we find the differences between the sides, that mostly depend on the fact who has been the source of the information. Michaiłowski-Danilewski claims that lost of Wołkoński and Essen were around 1000 dead and wounded. Savary reported that at Stanisławów there were died 800-1000 Russians and wounded were estimated by the troops of Driandorge on 17th of February at the level of 1000 men. most of them were lost without the care, because of the fact that French they could not provide them expected care. After several days Savary reported that peasants they had been killing wounded men and robbing its clothes. At Ostrołęka in estimation of Savary there were lost 500-600 died Russians and 1900 were wounded. In total he reported 1300-1600 died and 2900 wounded Russians. The losts of French he reported on the level 900 wounded and at least no died. On the other hand the 62nd Bulletin of the Grand Army published on 21st of February 1807 reported 60 died and 400-500 wounded. This data we also have to treat as reduced because of the fact that we know précised number of lost of Division of Grenadiers. It is 48 died and among that: 1 officer and 350 wounded including 12 officers. The highest lost was in Brigade of Ruffin, that defended Ostrołęka. It is possible to suspect that the lost of Campana were similar. From the estimation of the state of Vth Corps from 1st and 21st of February it is visible that there was less 2000 men. but in this number there also lost from both the battle at Ostrowia Mazowiecka and ill soldiers. Summary of the battle In the letter sent to Savary on 18th of February marshal Berthier wrote: "Emperor with the pleasure had found out about the battle at ostrołęka. He regretted general Campana. That fight it did not seem to him as general one. It is possible that the enemy they would like to take revenge. When it was standing in the front of yours you should have attack them on 17th of February and it might have been all right. But when the enemy retreated and you would like to leave the Ostrołęka then enemy might be able to get back to that town and everything might became not sure - even the fame of the army. And this could not be disdained (...)". Only the first sentence might satisfy the Savary and the rest was kept not as last critic post of Berthier but in the sour meaning. Nevertheless Napoleon was contented with the results of the battle, which propaganda meaning was great after the Iława context. He awarded the main commander Great Ribbon of Honorable Legia and annuity of 20.000 francs. Described meeting was not settled battle for both of the sides. It seemed that it is reasonable opinion of Petree: "Action of Savary, even if very significant because of the glory it was worthy to proof that Russians they were not great force and Napoleon he sould not have any reasons to be worried about the danger of breaking the lines of communication with Warsaw." Opinion of St. Herbst is much more critic in negative opinion of Savary: "Napoleon was disappointed with the Savary, that did not with the difficulties of self-reliant operating command. Having around the Brok in the beginning of February 15.000 men he did not eliminate radically the danger. Moreover he noted lost he also tired the army with long marshes and contra-marshes not protecting the main lines of french communications in difficult time after Iławka. In main head quarter there was a kind of afraid that not the Division of Siedmioradski but the whole Corps of Essen might have attack being shocked by the pyrrus glory of the army". It seemed that that point of view is the most rightful in its part concerning the first days of February when Savary felt at Ostrowia Maziwiecka. The expedition of russian troops to Wielbark it is difficult to consider as serious danger for the lines of communication. Finally those lines stayed not disturbed, Warsaw was protected so the role that was pointed to the Vth Corps was fulfilled. Posts of the Berthier are full of criticism and words of disappointment. On the other hand it seemed that opinions of menace for the right wing of the Great Army were somehow exaggerated. Savary fought back many of the accusations. The exchange of the correspondence shows the fact, that valuation of the situation by the Napoleon not always was related to the reality of the state of Vth Corps. It was because of the remote location and constant flow of events. Nevertheless the debut of the Savary in role of the chef of the Corps was not brilliant. Essen was also criticized by his command. Given the tusk he did not fulfill, because he had not beaten Savary and as a consequence could not support Benningsen in its operation in Pruss. The idea of synchronic attack failed because attack of Wołkoński on 15th of February was not accompanied by the attack of forces of Essen at the left side of Narew. Marsh of the Essen was delayed about one day. French managed to clear the danger at the side of Wołkonski and fight with the most of the forces against Essen. On the other hand in the background of the whole campaign 1806-1807 the battle at Ostrołęka has its particularity. It is laid in the fact that it was performed by two Observing Corps, that are located on the wings of its armies. Purposes of those Corps were rather defensive. Defeating of the enemy was needed but only in case of full certainty and without risking. Fight was started because of russian initiative. The fall at the Ostrołęka baffled that plan and as it seemed it had significant influence on the further flow of the events. The glory of the Savary it did not had any great meaning for Napoleon as the Corps of the Essen was not defeated. The important was only that it was in the one week time after the bloody and shameful battle at Iławka Pruska, that was very good to use of propaganda and strengthening spirit of the army. As the battles at the Pułtusk and Gołymin had general meaning for the whole campaign then battle at Ostrołęka decided about the safety of the Army. On the other hand the glory of the Savary it brought to Napoleon possibility of freely development of the action in Pruss without the danger for the communication lines and safety of Warsaw. After the battle Troops of Wołkoński after huge lost retreated in hurry burning all the bridges behind. Savary précised that he was moving towards to Kolno and Biała Piska. Essen at the same time was returning by Zambrów to Wysokie Mazowieckie. Savary stayed at Ostrołęka for the whole day 18th of February. But in the evening being informed by his sappers that the bridge on the Narew descended and it is menaced by the ice as it had been weaken during the marshes of soldiers and artillery on 16th and 17th of February. Savary ordered the at the same day crossing the Narew by the artillery and then the rest of the Corps leaving Ostrołęka. This order was accordingly to the indications from the Chef of the Staff, but it did not mean that Savary was not criticized by him. After leaving the Ostrołęka the army stood at the right side of Omulew. Division of Gazan took the area of Drężewo. In the front there was located chivalry of the Vth Corps under command of Debelle. Main forces and head quarter was in Siedliska, from where was sent the reconnaissance to Rozoga. Division of Suchet took the area of Przystań with avant-garde of 5th Division of Dragoons. That last troop took the Dylewo and from that sent the patrols to Rozogi. From that there was kept the contact with chivalry of Debelle on the right wing and on the left wing chasseurs of 2nd Regiment, that was among the troop of Grandeau in Myszyniec. The bridge in Ostrołęka was destroyed by the floating ice. On 21st of February Savary stood in Nożewo. In purpose of investigation of the movement of enemy he created the partisan troop of 100 men under command of chef of 10th Regiment of hussars Pyre. Under his command there was lieutenant Kierzkowski, whom he sent on the reconnaissance because of his knowledge of the polish language. On 24th of February retreated back and Gazan stood with 100th Regiment of infantry in Różan. 28th and 103rd Regiments stood in Pułtusk and in its surrounding area. On the line of Omulew there was left only the 21st Regiment of light infantry that stood in Nożewo, Białobrzegi and Przystań. Division of Suchet had its head quarter in Maków Mazowiecki, where stood also 64th and 88th Regiments of infantry. In Przasnysz there stood 34th and 40th Regiments and in Omulew 17th Regiment protecting the line from Baranów to Zawady. Chivalry was standing in Sieluń, Przasnysz, Chorzele and line of Orzyc from Podosie up to Olszewka. After several days of thawing weather the Narew became "as wide as Rhein" dividing both Corpses. Nevertheless there happened cossaks attacks on the right side of Narew. It appeared on the line of the Rozoga between Chorzele and Wielbark. Perhaps these were troops of ataman Płatow. the difficulties that appeared were not the problems only of Savary. Marshal Berthier informed in the letter to marshal Massena of 24th February, that he was nominated on the chef of the Vth Corps. Savary kept his position up to the end of February having his head quarter in Pułtusk. From the 1st of March he returned back to place at the side of Napoleon - to his former post of adjutant of Emperor. From that moment the command of the Corps belonged to Massena. After the relatively long period without the activity Essen dreated the avant-garde of 4 squadrons of Mariampol Regiment, 4 squadrons of Achturski Regiment and 300 Cossacks of 4th Regiment of Czernozubow. the whole command of avant-garde was given to Wittgenstein. His task was to cross the Narew and attack French with the troops of Płatow. He spent long time in Ostrołeka at reconstruction of the bridge. On 11th of March he had the possibility of the passage. Massena he prevented him to cross the river. Wittgenstein attacked Massena in Drężewo, Kruki and Białobrzegi killing 260 French and capturing 60 men and two cannons. Essen himself was doing nothing. His army suffered from hunger and illnesses so he wrote to tsar without informing the Benningsen to allow retreating to Russia heavy artillery and huge part of the chivalry. Tsar forbid him to do so and also to write to him without acceptation of Benningsen. Up to the end of March he did nothing and at the end of April he was dismissed because of the illness (?). Place of the Essen took Tuczkow. Up to the treaty of peace n Tylża there happened the fights between Vth Corps of Massena and Russians of Essen and then of Tuczkow. That events comes out of the time boundaries that were put to describe the battle at Ostrołęka. on the base: "Battle at Ostrołęka 1807 We are thankful to redaction board of portal http://www.ostroleka.info.pl and its acceptance for presenting this topic. |
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